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ABSTRACT 
While geoengineering may counteract negative effects of anthropogenic 
climate change, it is clear that most geoengineering options could also 
have some harmful effects.  Moreover, it is predicted that the benefits 
and harms of geoengineering will be distributed unevenly in different 
parts of the world and to future generations, which raises serious 
questions of justice. It has been suggested that a compensation scheme 
to redress geoengineering harms is needed for geoengineering to be 
ethically and politically acceptable. Discussions of compensation for 
geoengineering harms, however, sometimes presume geoengineering has 
presented new and unique challenges to compensation that cannot be 
readily accommodated by existing compensation practices. The most 
explicit formulation of this view was recently presented by Toby Svoboda 
and Peter J. Irvine, who argued that two forms of uncertainty in 
geoengineering—namely, ethical uncertainty and scientific uncertainty—
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make it immensely difficult to devise an ethically and politically 
satisfactory compensation scheme for geoengineering harms. 
 
In this paper, we argue against the view that geoengineering 
presents new and unique challenges relating to compensation. More 
specifically, we show that placing these challenges within the broader 
context of anthropogenic climate change reveals them to be less 
serious and less specific to geoengineering than some appear to 
believe.  
 
KEYWORDS: Geoengineering, Anthropogenic Climate Change, Harms, 
Ethical Uncertainty, Scientific Uncertainty, No-Fault Compensation 
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) recent inclusion 
of geoengineering – that is, “deliberately alter[ing] the climate system to 
counter climate change” (IPCC 2013) – in the Summary for Policymakers 
of the Working Group I Report has confirmed the increasing prominence 
of geoengineering in the climate change debate. Whatever benefits 
various geoengineering options may offer, it is clear that the deployment 
of most, if not all, geoengineering options could also have some harmful 
effects.1 Moreover, it is predicted that the benefits and harms of 
geoengineering will be distributed unevenly in different parts of the world 
and to future generations, which raises serious questions of justice 
(Svoboda et al 2011). It has been suggested that a compensation scheme 
to redress geoengineering harms is needed for geoengineering to be 
ethically and politically acceptable (GAO 2010; SRMGI 2011; Bunzl 2011; 
Abelkop & Carlson 2012; Holton et al 2013; Svoboda & Irvine 
forthcoming).2 
Discussions of compensation for geoengineering harms, however, 
sometimes presume geoengineering has presented new and unique 
challenges to compensation that cannot be readily accommodated by 
existing compensation practices. The most explicit formulation of this 
view was recently presented by Toby Svoboda and Peter J. Irvine 
(forthcoming), who argued that two forms of uncertainty in 
geoengineering—namely, ethical uncertainty and scientific uncertainty—
make it immensely difficult to devise an ethically and politically 
satisfactory compensation scheme for geoengineering harms. In this 
paper, we argue against the view that geoengineering presents new and 
unique challenges relating to compensation. More specifically, we show 
that placing these challenges within the broader context of anthropogenic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  various	  geoengineering	  options	  and	  their	  potential	  side	  effects,	  see	  Royal	  Society	  (2009),	  Vaughan	  &	  Lenton	  (2011).	  2	  This	  is	  not	  to	  assert	  that	  a	  satisfactory	  compensation	  scheme	  for	  geoengineering	  harms	  is	  sufficient	  to	  justify	  the	  deployment	  of	  geoengineering,	  but	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  deployment	  to	  be	  ethically	  and	  politically	  acceptable.	  
	  
	  
COMPENSATION	  FOR	  GEOENGINEERING	  HARMS	  AND	  NO-­‐FAULT	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  COMPENSATION	  
	  






climate change reveals them to be less serious and less specific to 
geoengineering than some appear to believe. 3  
First, we address the concerns relating to ethical uncertainty. We argue 
that the concerns raised by Svoboda and Irvine are similar to those raised 
by compensation for harms from anthropogenic climate change more 
generally, and indeed to those raised by compensation schemes in 
general. We also suggest, by drawing on the wider discussion about the 
compensation for anthropogenic climate change-related harms, a possible 
strategy for answering these challenges. 
We then turn to the challenges relating to scientific uncertainty. Here, we 
again argue that the challenges are similar to those we face in seeking to 
compensate for harms from anthropogenic climate change more 
generally.  We then argue that these concerns could be avoided by 
incorporating compensation for geoengineering harms within a broader 
no-fault compensation scheme for all climate-related harms. Moreover, 
there is in any case an independent reason to prefer this broader 
approach.  
Finally, we draw out some of the policy implications of our arguments and 
tentatively propose a general climate compensation fund to compensate 
for geoengineering harms, the negative effects of anthropogenic climate 
change and other adverse natural climatic events. 
 
2. Ethical Uncertainty in Geoengineering Harms Compensation 
Svoboda and Irvine argued that there is ethical uncertainty in assigning 
responsibility for geoengineering harms, and thus it is unclear who ought 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  We	  should	  note	  that	  there	  are	  different	  types	  of	  geoengineering	  options,	  and	  the	  scope	  and	  degree	  of	  (harmful)	  impacts	  will	  vary	  from	  one	  option	  to	  another,	  and	  that	  Svoboda	  and	  Irvine	  have	  limited	  their	  discussion	  only	  to	  solar	  radiation	  management,	  i.e.	  geoengineering	  options	  that	  aim	  to	  reflect	  sun’s	  light	  and	  heat	  back	  into	  the	  space.	  Yet,	  their	  arguments	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  compensation	  for	  harms	  associated	  with	  solar	  radiation	  management	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  its	  specifics,	  and	  thus	  the	  same	  line	  of	  arguments	  can	  be	  made	  against	  other	  types	  of	  geoengineering	  options	  too.	  In	  short,	  their	  arguments	  can	  be	  generalised	  to	  geoengineering	  (understood	  as	  a	  broad	  category	  that	  includes	  different	  geoengineering	  options)	  insofar	  as	  it	  exhibits	  ethical	  uncertainty	  and	  scientific	  uncertainty.	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to provide compensation.4 By “ethical uncertainty”, they meant the 
existing principles in climate ethics for assigning responsibility for 
compensation fall short of providing a clear answer to the ascription of 
responsibility for geoengineering harms compensation. In this section, we 
shall scrutinise their discussion of ethical uncertainty in compensation for 
geoengineering harms and argue that it fails to show that geoengineering 
present a new and unique problem for compensation. We should note that 
the purpose here is not to demonstrate a particular principle is the correct 
principle for guiding compensation responses to geoengineering, nor to 
assert some principles can conclusively resolve what they called ethical 
uncertainty in geoengineering harms compensation. Our aim is rather to 
show that discussions of the compensation for geoengineering harms 
should be placed against the background of the compensation for the 
negative effects of anthropogenic climate change, and that once this is 
done, the problem will appear both less specific to geoengineering and 
less insurmountable. 
Svoboda and Irvine argued that familiar principles in climate ethics for 
assigning responsibility for compensation—namely, the polluter pays 
principle (PPP), the beneficiary pays principle (BPP), and the ability to pay 
principle (ATP)—yield incorrect verdicts on who ought to fund 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In	  additional	  to	  the	  question	  of	  assigning	  responsibility	  for	  geoengineering	  harms,	  Svoboda	  and	  Irvine	  also	  discussed	  the	  question	  of	  the	  entitlement	  to	  compensation	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  to	  be	  provided.	  Here,	  we	  shall	  only	  examine	  the	  question	  of	  assigning	  responsibility	  for	  geoengineering	  harms,	  as	  it	  presents	  the	  most	  direct	  challenge	  to	  the	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  a	  compensation	  scheme	  for	  geoengineering	  harms.	  Yet,	  our	  response	  to	  their	  arguments	  from	  ethical	  uncertainty	  and	  scientific	  uncertainty	  will	  also	  provide	  (partial)	  answers	  to	  the	  other	  questions	  discussed	  by	  them.	  For	  instance,	  Svoboda	  and	  Irvine	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  three	  possible	  types	  of	  victims:	  (i)	  those	  who	  are	  harmed	  by	  the	  impacts	  of	  geoengineering,	  (ii)	  those	  who	  are	  harmed	  by	  negative	  effects	  of	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change,	  and	  (iii)	  those	  who	  are	  harmed	  by	  missing	  out	  on	  benefits	  they	  would	  have	  from	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  had	  geoengineering	  not	  been	  implemented,	  and	  they	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  ethical	  uncertainty	  in	  determining	  which	  types	  of	  victims	  are	  entitled	  to	  compensation.	  According	  to	  the	  proposal	  of	  a	  
general	  climate	  compensation	  fund	  that	  cover	  all	  climate-­‐related	  harms	  we	  are	  arguing	  for,	  we	  believe	  that	  those	  who	  suffer	  from	  climate-­‐related	  harms	  (that	  are	  beyond	  one’s	  control)	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  compensation,	  thus	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	  do	  not	  differ	  in	  nature	  and	  should	  both	  be	  entitled	  to	  compensation.	  Whether	  (iii)	  is	  entitled	  to	  compensation	  will	  be	  determined	  in	  part	  by	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘harm’,	  as	  well	  as	  whether	  the	  purported	  victims	  deserve	  the	  benefits	  from	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  (see,	  Bunzl	  2011).	  As	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation,	  our	  proposal	  of	  a	  general	  climate	  compensation	  fund	  implies	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  set	  at	  an	  amount	  of	  basic	  compensation	  similar	  to	  social	  security	  at	  the	  societal-­‐level.	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compensation for geoengineering harms.5 They attempted to show that 
the results follow from those principles are counter-intuitive via different 
imaginary scenarios. For instance, to show that PPP is inappropriate for 
determining who is responsible for the provision of geoengineering harms 
compensation, they imagine 
Scenario 1. “[A] developing island state with widespread poverty, 
whose survival is threatened by sea-level rise, decides to join a 
coalition of states that deploys [geoengineering]. Since this 
developing state (and/or individuals within it) would be an agent of 
[geoengineering], it would be responsible for providing compensation 
to victims” (Svoboda & Irvine forthcoming).  
PPP requires those who have caused harms to be held responsible for the 
provision of compensation (see, e.g. Singer 2002, Chapter 2; Caney 
2005, 2010). They argued that PPP yields a counter-intuitive verdict in 
Scenario 1, as it is not “ethically appropriate to require a poor state to 
compensate victims of a policy that was necessary for that state’s 
survival” (Svoboda & Irvine forthcoming).  
Similarly, to show that BPP is inapplicable to the ascription of 
responsibility for geoengineering harms compensation, they imagine 
Scenario 2A. “[Geoengineering] is deployed over the strong objection 
of some state and the vast majority of its citizens, but that this state 
and its citizens happen to benefit from the impacts of 
[geoengineering]” (Svoboda & Irvine forthcoming). 
Scenario 2B. “[S]ome developed state unilaterally deploys 
[geoengineering] in accordance with its perceived self-interest and 
with the consent of the vast majority of its citizens, but that in doing 
so its own citizens are made slightly worse off and those of other 
states are made substantially worse off” (Svoboda & Irvine 
forthcoming).  
BPP requires those who have unjustly or wrongfully benefitted from an 
activity to provide compensation to those who are harmed by that activity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  They	  have	  also	  briefly	  discussed	  the	  hybridised	  approaches,	  i.e.	  approaches	  that	  combine	  different	  feature(s)	  of	  PPP,	  BPP,	  and/or	  ATP.	  We	  will	  only	  focus	  on	  their	  discussion	  of	  PPP,	  BPP	  and	  ATP	  here,	  and	  will	  return	  to	  their	  criticism	  of	  hybrid	  principles	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  section.	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(see, e.g. Gosseries 2004; Page 2012; Baatz 2013). For Scenario 2A, 
they argued that BPP leads to the counter-intuitive result of requiring a 
state that is not causally responsible for geoengineering harms to be 
responsible for compensating them. And, they pointed out that since 
there is no beneficiary in Scenario 2B, BPP fails to identify the right party 
to be held responsible even if the state deployed geoengineering 
unilaterally seems to be a clear candidate to bear such a responsibility. 
Finally, they imagine 
Scenario 3. “[S]ome developed state refuses to join a coalition of 
states deploying [geoengineering], arguing against such deployment” 
(Svoboda & Irvine forthcoming).  
ATP requires the advantaged, i.e. the developed state, to be responsible 
for compensating the disadvantaged (see, e.g. Shue 1999; Caney 2005, 
2010). Svoboda and Irvine argued that ATP leads to the counter-intuitive 
result of requiring a state to compensate for geoengineering harms that it 
did not cause simply because it has the ability to do so. 
We agree that these scenarios highlight ways in which applying one of 
PPP, BPP and ATP as the sole governing principle for compensation can 
produce counter-intuitive results. Note, however, that this problem is not 
specific to the compensation of geoengineering harms. Similar intuitions 
can be elicited regarding attempts to compensate for the negative effects 
of anthropogenic climate change. Thus consider,  
Scenario 1*:  A developing state whose survival is threatened by 
poverty as a result of unjust treatment by a former colonial power, 
decides to promote rapid industrialisation, with concomitant 
contributions to climate change, as a means to combat poverty. 
Since this developing state (and/or individuals within it) would be an 
agent of the intensification of anthropogenic climate change, it would 
be responsible (according to PPP) for providing compensation to 
victims. 
Scenario 1* and 1 only differ in the type of climate-altering actions 
involved, i.e. rapid industrialisation and the deployment of 
geoengineering. Just as in Scenario 1, it too seems to be intuitively wrong 
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to require the poor state to compensate victims of a policy that was 
necessary for its survival in Scenario 1*, and thus our scenario shows that 
PPP is problematic without referring to geoengineering. The problem to 
PPP highlighted by Svoboda and Irvine, therefore, is not new and unique 
to geoengineering harms compensation; it is in fact a general problem for 
PPP and compensation for any human-induced climatic event. 
The same is true of Svoboda and Irvine’s cases against BPP and ATP as 
well, and similar scenarios can be construed for Scenario 2A, 2B and 3. 
For instance,  
Scenario 2A*: A policy to bolster carbon-intensive industries is 
implemented over the strong objection of some state and the vast 
majority of its citizens, but this state and its citizens happen to 
benefit from the policy. 
Scenario 2B*: Some developed state implements a policy to bolster 
carbon-intensive industries in accordance with its perceived self-
interest and with the consent of the vast majority of its citizens, but 
in doing so its own citizens are made slightly worse off and those of 
other states are made substantially worse off.  
Scenario 3*: Some developed state refuses to join a coalition of 
states to intensify carbon-intensive industries, arguing against this 
path of development. 
Notice that Scenario 2A* and 2B* illustrate the same problems to BPP 
described by Svoboda and Irvine without referring to geoengineering. In 
other words, BPP requires a state which has not contributed to the 
intensification of anthropogenic climate change to shoulder the burden of 
compensation in Scenario 2A*, and it too fails to identify the right party 
to be responsible for compensation in Scenario 2B* because there is no 
beneficiary. And, Scenario 3* again illustrates the same problem to ATP 
described by Svoboda and Irvine without referring to geoengineering. 
There, according to ATP, the developed state is required to bear the 
responsibility for compensation despite not contributing to the 
intensification of anthropogenic climate change. 
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In short, the problems with PPP, BPP, and ATP highlighted by Svoboda 
and Irvine’s imaginary scenarios are not specific to geoengineering harms 
compensation, but are general problems for those principles and 
compensation for any human-induced climatic event. 
In effect, similar problems could be raised in relation to many existing 
compensation schemes for other kinds of harms. A number of states 
administer compensation schemes for medical injuries, motor vehicle 
accidents, past wartime atrocities and the effects of unjust colonial 
practices among other harms. In all of these cases, financing the 
compensation solely on the basis of causal responsibility (as in PPP), 
benefit (as in BPP), or the ability to pay (as in ATP) can produce 
intuitively problematic results.6 We believe that merely placing the 
Svoboda and Irvine’s concerns about ethical uncertainty within the 
broader context of other compensation practices helps to reduce the force 
of those concerns, for in at least some of these other areas, the presence 
of these concerns would not be taken as a decisive reason for eschewing 
the possibility of compensation.  
There is also a more specific way in which placing these concerns within a 
broader context helps to diminish their force. As we have seen, the 
concerns raised by Svoboda and Irvine in relation to compensation for 
geoengineering harms arise also in relation to proposals to compensate 
for the negative effects of anthropogenic climate change more generally, 
i.e. Scenario 1*-3*. But within that context, it has been suggested that 
these concerns might be abated by adopting some combinations of PPP, 
BPP and ATP (see, e.g. Page 2008, 2011; Caney 2005, 2010). This seems 
a plausible strategy in geoengineering harms compensation too, since in 
each of the cases that Svoboda and Irvine raised (and in each of the 
variants of these cases that we provide above), applying one of these 
principles provides intuitively implausible results at least in part because it 
leads to the considerations invoked by the other principles being 
neglected. For example, it is plausible that PPP yields intuitively 
implausible result in Scenario 1 and 1* in part because it does not take 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  these	  cases,	  see	  Waldron	  (1995).	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into account the developing state’s ability to pay for compensation. 
Similarly, BPP and ATP yield counter-intuitive results in Scenario 2-3 and 
2*-3* in part because they have overlooked the importance of causal 
responsibility. 
Svoboda and Irvine do briefly consider the possibility of solving the 
challenges they raise by combining PPP, BPP and ATP, but they question 
the viability of hybrid principles on the ground that “proponents of hybrid 
principles must meet [the] difficult challenge of explaining why one 
particular hybrid should be adopted over others” (Svoboda & Irvine 
forthcoming). This criticism is perplexing, however, for they have already 
alluded to one possible strategy by which we can assess different hybrid 
principles: by consulting our intuitions regarding their implications for 
cases such as Scenario 1-3. Moreover, it is unclear why their doubts 
regarding hybrid principles should only apply to geoengineering harms 
compensation and not to other compensation practices. This, however, 
calls into question all compensation practices based on hybrid principles 
and implies that they all face a difficult challenge of explaining why one 
hybrid principle should be preferred. We take this implausible 
consequence to be a reductio of their argument against hybrid principles. 
Of course, we have not provided a definitive answer to the question of 
how responsibility for compensating geoengineering harms should be 
allocated. Our discussion does suggest, however, that hybrid principles 
may provide an answer to it. Indeed, several hybrid principles have 
already been proposed and developed in climate ethics for assigning 
responsibility for compensation for harms from anthropogenic climate 
change, unless geoengineering harms and anthropogenic climate change-
related harms are radically different, it seems that they too are viable 
principles to guide the design and implementation of geoengineering 
harms compensation. 
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A more direct challenge to the possibility of a satisfactory compensation 
scheme for geoengineering harms, we think, comes from what Svoboda 
and Irvine term “scientific uncertainty”. More specifically, they point to 
the problem of detection and the problem of attribution as two major 
challenges in compensating geoengineering harms. Briefly, the problem of 
detection refers to the problem of detecting changes in the climate 
system, and the problem of attribution refers to the problem of attributing 
those changes to specific causes (or, a set of causal factors). Both 
problems arise from the complex and chaotic nature of the climate system 
and its intricate interactions with non-climate systems. Accordingly, it is 
difficult—if not impossible—to isolate the impacts of geoengineering from 
the impacts of climate change in general, and relatedly, to identify who 
are the ‘polluters’ or ‘beneficiaries’ of geoengineering, as causal links 
between the harms and benefits and the deployment of geoengineering 
are not readily available.  
Note, however, that this problem is again shared by attempts to 
compensate harms caused by anthropogenic climate change. Svoboda 
and Irvine claimed that it is difficult—if not impossible—to detect changes 
in the climate system, and to establish causal links between specific 
impacts and the deployment of geoengineering. Yet, if the problem of 
detection and the problem of attribution, or more generally scientific 
uncertainty in geoengineering, are due to the complex and chaotic nature 
of the climate system and its interactions with non-climate systems, then 
they apply equally to other climate change-related events, too. From a 
scientific perspective, it makes no difference whether you put something 
into the system intentionally or not. There is no difference, from a 
scientific perspective of evaluating effects on the system, whether a 
perturbation is the result of deliberate geoengineering or unintentional 
carbon dioxide emissions from human activities. 
It can also be questioned whether scientific uncertainty in geoengineering 
(and in anthropogenic climate change) is impossible to overcome (see, 
e.g. Allen 2003; Horton et al 2013). Let us, however, grant for the 
moment the problem of detection and the problem of attribution are 
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irresolvable. Does this mean that we cannot redress the harms caused by 
geoengineering? Surely, if we cannot isolate the impacts of 
geoengineering from other climate change-related impacts, or identify 
who is harmed and benefited by the deployment of geoengineering, it 
does not make sense to compensate for ‘geoengineering’ harms for we 
cannot tell if the impacts are really geoengineering-based or not, nor can 
we tell whether someone is really harmed or benefited by the deployment 
of geoengineering but not other climate change-related events. However, 
to adequately redress geoengineering harms (or, harms purported to be 
caused by geoengineering), all that is required is a compensation scheme 
that covers all climate-related harms, regardless of they are caused by 
geoengineering, other human activities, or natural factors.  
In what follows, we argue first, that there are in fact good reasons to 
prefer a compensation scheme that is inclusive of harms from 
geoengineering, other human activities, and natural factors. First, such a 
compensation scheme would mitigate the problems posed by scientific 
uncertainty in geoengineering since it would obviate the need to ascertain 
the causal contribution of different sources to a given harm. Second, 
there is an independent, fairness-based reason to favour such a 
compensation scheme.  
As we have already argued, it is useful to place the consideration of 
geoengineering harms compensation within the broader context of the 
compensation for harms from anthropogenic climate change. We have 
also noted that it is reasonable to expect some hybrid principles in climate 
ethics to be applicable to compensation for geoengineering harms and 
other climate change-related harms. As such, it might be more 
appropriate to view compensation for geoengineering harms as an 
expansion of the compensation for anthropogenic climate change-related 
harms in general, as the applicable principles may be the same in both 
cases.  
The plausibility of distinguishing geoengineering harms, the negative 
effects of anthropogenic climate change and other natural adverse climate 
impacts can be questioned as well. It has been argued that to the extent 
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human activities have become a constitutive part of earth (eco)systems, a 
new epoch of Anthropocene has arrived (Crutzen & Stoermer 2000; 
Crutzen 2002; Steffen et al 2011). From the perspective of Anthropocene, 
a distinction between ‘human-induced’ and ‘natural’ climate impacts is 
questionable. Hence, a general climate compensation fund is more fitting 
from the perspective of Anthropocene, as it is not based on a 
questionable distinction between ‘human-induced’ and ‘natural’ climate 
impacts. It is also more desirable with respect to the problems of 
scientific uncertainty, because it does not need to distinguish different 
types of climate impacts according to their causal history. A general 
climate compensation fund will cover climate impacts ranging from 
geoengineering harms, the negative effects of anthropogenic climate 
change and other adverse climatic events. In short, the challenges from 
scientific uncertainty, viewed from the perspective of the Anthropocene, 
suggest that it is unnecessary to compensate specifically for 
geoengineering harms. 
However, it can be argued that geoengineering harms ought to be treated 
differently because they are results of deliberate actions, whereas the 
negative effects of anthropogenic climate change and other natural 
adverse climate impacts are not. Accordingly, geoengineering harms are 
of a different nature from other types of climate-related harms. If 
geoengineering harms are indeed different in nature, then perhaps they 
should be treated differently as well.  
Yet, we think there is little ethical difference in moral responsibility for 
geoengineering and anthropogenic climate change, now that we can 
foresee the effects of our actions undertaken today. What goes under the 
name of ‘geoengineering’ is the intentional manipulation of the climate. 
Yet, climate-altering actions today, e.g. carbon dioxide emissions, 
foreseeably and avoidably alter the climate, though unintentionally. Moral 
responsibility for the effect of an action is arguably a function of the 
foreseeability of that effect and its avoidability. Thus, we may be morally 
responsible for geoengineering as much as we are morally responsible for 
other climate-altering actions. So if compensation will be due for 
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foreseeable and avoidable effects of climate-altering actions, it too due for 
intentional geoengineering-based harms.  
However, instead of exploring the question about the nature of 
geoengineering harms and their (dis)similarities with other types of 
climate-related harms in greater detail, we shall now argue that it is 
unfair, from the victim’s perspective, to treat geoengineering harms 
differently, and thereby strengthening our claim that a general climate 
compensation fund is ethically more preferable. Differentiated treatments 
of geoengineering harms are premised on the idea that the provision of 
compensation ought to depend on the causal history of a climate-related 
harm. As such, victims who suffer an equal amount of harm, and an 
equally beyond the control of the victims, could be treated unequally. 
Thus, consider7 
Scenario 4: State B has successfully deployed sulphate aerosol 
injection, which leads to a reduction of summer monsoon 
precipitation and resulting in severe droughts in State A. The 
droughts have killed a large number of people and caused enormous 
financial damage with crop and livestock failures in State A. 
Scenario 5. A volcano has erupted in State D, which has injected 
sulphate aerosol into the stratosphere. The sulphate aerosol injected 
by the volcanic eruption leads to a reduction of summer monsoon 
precipitation and resulting in severe droughts in State C. The 
droughts have killed a large number of people and caused enormous 
financial damage with crop and livestock failures in State C. 
Differentiated treatments of geoengineering harms could be grounded on 
the thought that we should compensate the harms in these two scenarios 
differently. They might maintain, for example, that State A is entitled to a 
compensation from State B, whereas State C’s is not entitled to 
compensation from State D, because the harms endured by State A were 
deliberately caused by State B, while the harms suffered by State C were 
not deliberately caused. Yet, it seems unfair to deny victims of harms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  following	  scenarios	  are	  based	  on	  Robock’s	  research,	  see	  Robock	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  Robock	  &	  Kravitz	  (2013).	  
	  
	  
COMPENSATION	  FOR	  GEOENGINEERING	  HARMS	  AND	  NO-­‐FAULT	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  COMPENSATION	  
	  






compensation merely because those harms are caused differently, 
especially when the harms suffered by State C are not within its control. 
This intuition can be buttressed with a powerful and widely shared 
conception of fairness according to which any relative disadvantage is 
unfair if it was not within the control of its victims.8 This conception of 
fairness, however, entails something more radical. Now, consider an 
additional scenario 
Scenario 6: A volcano has unexpectedly erupted in State E, which 
has injected sulphate aerosol into the stratosphere. The sulphate 
aerosol injected by the volcanic eruption leads to a reduction of 
summer monsoon precipitation and resulting in severe droughts in its 
own territory. The droughts have killed a large number of people and 
caused enormous financial damage with crop and livestock failures in 
State E. 
The only difference Scenario 6 has from the earlier scenarios is that the 
harms suffered by State E are caused naturally and no perpetrator can be 
identified. Yet, if one accepts the conception of fairness we have just 
outlined, and believes that it is unfair to deny State C to be compensated, 
it follows that State E ought to be provided compensation too. For the 
harms, which are caused by a natural event, is also beyond State E’s 
control.  
There are two implications of this argument from fairness. First, if the 
argument is decisive, we should not treat geoengineering harms 
differently from the negative effects of anthropogenic climate change and 
other adverse natural climatic events, such as volcanic eruptions, floods, 
tornadoes, landslides, etc., provided all events were beyond the control of 
their victims. This lends immediate support to the idea of a general 
climate compensation fund that covers all climate-related harms. Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  conception	  of	  fairness	  is	  not	  uncontroversial.	  A	  broader	  conception	  of	  fairness	  (see,	  e.g.	  Broome	  1990)	  maintains	  that	  fairness	  consists	  in	  responding	  proportionally	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  different	  individuals.	  The	  narrower	  account	  of	  fairness	  that	  we	  propose	  here	  is	  intended	  to	  supplement	  the	  broader	  account	  with	  the	  view	  that	  two	  individuals	  can	  have	  different	  claims	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  factors	  within	  their	  control.	  However,	  one	  may	  deny	  this	  claim.	  For	  example,	  by	  arguing	  the	  victims	  of	  wrongdoings	  have	  stronger	  claims	  to	  compensation	  than	  the	  victims	  of	  natural	  misfortunate.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  offer	  a	  defence	  of	  this	  conception	  of	  fairness,	  but	  we	  think	  the	  intuitive	  appeal	  of	  this	  conception	  warrants	  a	  serious	  consideration	  of	  it.	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the argument suggests that, in cases where harms were anthropogenic or 
at least preventable by other people, the payment of compensation 
should not depend on whether other people were at fault for the harm. All 
that matters is that the harm was not within the control of the victim. 
Fortuitously, a compensation scheme with these features also offers at 
least a partial solution to the challenges of scientific uncertainty. Recall 
that scientific uncertainty posed two problems. The problem of detection 
was the problem of determining that a change to the climate system had 
occurred. This would not longer be necessary under the sort of 
compensation scheme recommended by our argument from fairness. It 
would need to be shown only that some form of climate-related harm had 
occurred, regardless whether it was due to any change in the climate 
system. The second problem was the problem of attribution—the problem 
of identifying the specific causes of a harm. This would also not be 
necessary. It would be necessary only to show that the harm was not 
within the control of the victim (or perhaps, not reasonably within her 
control).  
A move towards a general climate compensation fund, however, has a 
notable policy implication. Particularly, as the fund aims to be all-inclusive 
with respect to the harms caused by various climatic events, be they 
human-induced or natural, the amount of funding required will be 
significant. Economically, it might mean that the amount of compensation 
offered to the victims will not be to restore them to status quo ante, but, 
perhaps, an amount of basic compensation similar to social security at the 
societal-level. 
We should note that our discussion so far has assumed the 
insurmountability of scientific uncertainty in geoengineering (and 
anthropogenic climate change). This, however, has been contested (Allen 
2003; Horton et al 2013). Perhaps, with scientific and technological 
advancement, scientific uncertainty in geoengineering can be sufficiently 
overcome in the future. Thus, it is perhaps worth noting that one of our 
arguments for a general climate compensation would stand intact even if 
there is little or no scientific uncertainty in geoengineering. The argument 
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from fairness outlined above does not depend on the truth of scientific 
certainty, it appeals directly to one of our conceptualisation of fairness, 
and leads to the conclusion that geoengineering harms should be treated 
the same as other types of climate-related harms.  
 
4. The General Climate Compensation Fund: A Tentative Proposal 
We have argued that geoengineering does not present new and unique 
challenges to compensation, particularly that the design and 
implementation of compensation schemes for geoengineering harms faces 
no more difficulties than designing and implementing a compensation 
scheme for the negative effects from anthropogenic climate change. We 
have also argued that geoengineering harms should be treated the same 
as other types of climate-related harms, and illustrated some implications 
of this position. It should be pointed out that we have not argued for the 
provision of compensation for geoengineering harms or other types of 
climate related-harms in this paper—we have argued only that if 
compensation is to be provided for such harms, it should not be 
dependent on whether the harms were due to geoengineering, 
anthropogenic climate change, or other natural climatic events. One way 
of ensuring this would be to introduce a general climate compensation 
fund.  
Here, we wish to remain neutral on how the general climate compensation 
fund should be financed—it will ultimately depend on what relative weight 
should be given to ability to pay and contribution to climate-related harms 
and benefits (insofar as these things can be determined). If it is possible 
to identify those who have (wrongfully) causally contributed to climate-
related harms, then it would in principle be possible to finance the fund 
entirely through fines imposed on these parties. However, this would 
effectively result in the ‘polluters’ being required to compensate both 
those whom they have harmed (with geoengineering and/or climate-
altering actions) and the victims of adverse natural climatic events, 
assuming there is a meaningful distinction between these. This might 
seem difficult to justify. Similarly, the fund can be financed entirely by 
those who have unjustly or wrongfully benefitted from geoengineering 
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and/or anthropogenic climate change, but it implies that the ‘beneficiaries’ 
would be required to give up their benefits as well as compensating the 
victims of adverse natural climatic events. This too seems to be difficult to 
justify. These concerns suggest that the fund would need to be financed 
at least in part on the basis of ability to pay.  
It is not our intention to elaborate and defend a specific account of how 
the general compensation fund should be financed, but we think it is 
helpful to propose one way to finance the fund. We suggest the fund can 
be financed by various states contributing a small portion of their GDP to 
provide basic compensation for the victims of climate-related harms. The 
tentative proposal we advance will require the wealthy states to 
contribute more to the fund than the less wealthy states and poor states. 
We believe that such a proposal can be justified by appealing to the duty 
of easy rescue: A has the duty to aid B when the cost for A to do so is 
small, and the benefit to B is very large (Singer 1972, Savulescu 2007). 
Since our proposal requires only a small contribution from the wealthy 
states, it will have little impact on their wealth (and of the well-being of 
its citizens), and the benefits to the victims will be sufficiently large, thus 
could be justified by the duty of easy rescue. 
There are numerous issues remain to be resolved if the fund is to be 
realised. Particularly, there are institutional questions such as “what 
institution(s) will be responsible for handling the fund?”, “how to ensure 
various states have contribute to the fund?”, etc., and operational 
questions such as “how to determine the threshold to qualify for 
compensation?”, etc. These are important questions for a fully developed 
account of the general climate compensation fund. To reiterate, it is not 
our intention to provide a fully developed account of the general climate 
compensation fund, but merely to point out that it is one way to 
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